Abstract-Modular exponentiation in an abelian group is one of the most frequently used mathematical primitives in modern cryptography. Batch verification is an algorithm for verifying many exponentiations simultaneously. We propose two fast batch verification algorithms. The first one makes use of exponents of small weight, called sparse exponents, and is asymptotically 10 times faster than individual verification and twice as fast as previous works at the same security level. The second one can only be applied to elliptic curves defined over small finite fields. Using sparse Frobenius expansion with small integer coefficients, we give a complex exponent test which is four times faster than the previous works. For example, each exponentiation in one batch asymptotically requires nine elliptic curve additions on some elliptic curves for 2 80 security.
INTRODUCTION

B
ATCH verification is an algorithm for verifying many exponentiations simultaneously. Let G be an abelian group with a generator g. Given a batch instance of n exponentiation pairs fðx 1 ; y 1 Þ; ðx 2 ; y 2 Þ; . . . ; ðx n ; y n Þg with x i 2 Z Z and y i 2 G, the algorithm checks the validity of g xi ¼ y i for all i, simultaneously. The small exponent test [2] achieves this by checking if g P n i¼1
x i s i ¼ Q n i¼1 y si i for randomly chosen ' bit integers s i , given the screening parameter '. We extend the idea of the small exponent test by considering other exponent sets and improve the performance through the use of sparse exponents.
Our idea is to use random exponents of larger bit size, but of smaller Hamming weight. The probability of a wrong batch instance passing the proposed test with an exponent set S will be shown to be at most 1=jSj if all elements belonging to S are distinct modulo the order of the given group. Therefore, the problem of selecting the exponent set S in such a way as to maximize the number of elements that are distinct modulo the order of the group is important.
If we take S to be the set of integers from Z Z p of Hamming weight k 19, for a 160 bit prime p, then jSj is greater than 2 80 . In this case, our sparse exponent test requires at most 208 þ 19n multiplications to verify n exponents with 2 80 security, while the original small exponent test requires 272 þ 40n multiplications on average.
A variant of the algorithm, where sparse signed binary exponents are used, is also considered. It is appropriate for verifying scalar multiplication on elliptic curves where a subtraction is as efficient as an addition. In other situations, savings can be obtained by using exponents larger than the order of the underlying group. This is applicable to signature schemes where the order of the underlying group is kept secret, such as RSA, Cramer-Shoup signatures [6] , and Guillou-Quisquater (GQ) signatures [9] .
We can extend the exponent set to complex endomorphisms on elliptic curves. When an elliptic curve is defined over a small finite field IF q , we have a very efficient complex endomorphism called the Frobenius map. We can take polynomials of the Frobenius map with small integer coefficients as the exponent set S. In most previous works with Frobenius expansions, the set of coefficients was forced to have at most q cardinality to provide for uniqueness of representation (for more references, refer to [14] ). In our method, however, we enlarge the coefficient set to all integers whose absolute values are less than q 2 =2 and coprime to q and prove that each element of S is distinct as an endomorphism on the cyclic subgroup of the elliptic curve if each element of S has no adjacent nonzero coefficients. As a result, we obtain a batch verification which is four times faster than previous works. For example, in our method, each exponentiation asymptotically requires nine elliptic curve additions on Koblitz curves for 2 80 security.
Batch Cryptography
Batch cryptography was first introduced by Fiat [8] . He introduced an algorithm to obtain two exponentiations through one full exponentiation and several small exponentiations. More techniques on batch computations can be found in [3] , [12] . Batch verification of exponentiation was first proposed by Naccache et al. [15] to verify modified DSA signatures efficiently. They used the set consisting of e-bit prime numbers for small e as the exponent set. Yen and Laih [18] improved the test by adopting the small exponent set f0; 1g ' for the screening parameter '. Bellare et al. [2] gave systematic approaches with two more tests. These are the atomic test, which uses S ¼ f0; 1g, and the bucket test, which combines the atomic test with the small exponent test. Later, Boyd and Pavlovski [4] indicated a weakness of batch tests when they are used on nonprime order subgroups. Current batch verifications are efficient at verifying many signatures done by one signer. Applications include: 1) an authenticated database in which each data is signed by a data owner [13] , 2) electronic commerce where shops or banks need to verify many coins, usually issued by one bank, and 3) voting protocols where a huge number of votes need to be checked for signatures signed by the voting center before being counted as valid.
Organization
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce a general approach for batch verification and discuss its security. In Section 3, we propose a batch verification algorithm using sparse binary exponents and also give variants using sparse signed binary exponents and sparse long exponents. In Section 4, we consider complex exponents on elliptic curves. We conclude in Section 5.
BATCH VERIFICATION
We will follow [2] in giving out the various definitions and notations concerning batch verification. Let G be a cyclic group of order p with a generator g and define a Boolean relation Rð Á Þ on the set of instances fðx; yÞjx 2 Z Z p ; y 2 Gg. We say that Rðx; yÞ ¼ 1 or that the instance ðx; yÞ is correct if and only if g x ¼ y. A batch instance for relation R is a sequence inst 1 ; Á Á Á ; inst n of instances for R. We say that the batch instance is correct ðRðinst 1 ; . . . ; inst n Þ ¼ 1Þ if Rðinst i Þ ¼ 1 for all i ¼ 1; . . . ; n and incorrect ðRðinst 1 ; . . . ; inst n Þ ¼ 0Þ if there is some i 2 f1; . . . ; ng for which Rðinst i Þ ¼ 0. Definition 1. Given a screening parameter ', a batch verifier for relation R of error 2 À' is a probabilistic algorithm V that either accepts or rejects a given batch instance X for R, subject to the following condition:
1. Any correct batch instance X is always accepted. 2. The probability for V to accept an incorrect X is at most 2 À' . Now, we consider a subset S of Z Z such that the difference of any two elements in S is coprime to p and define a batch verifier V S as given by Fig. 1 .
Note that any correct batch instance will always pass the test, but even a wrong instance may pass the test with some probability. If we let i 2 Z Z p be such that g i ¼ y i =g x i , the test will accept if and only if g P n i¼1
sii ¼ 1. where ¼ ð 1 ; . . . ; n Þ runs through all but ð0; 0; Á Á Á ; 0Þ in Z Z n p . Now, we show an upper bound for ErrðV S Þ. Theorem 1. Let S be a subset of nonnegative integers such that the difference of any two elements in S is coprime to p. Then, we have
Proof. Consider a batch instance of n exponentiation pairs ðx 1 ; y 1 Þ; . . . ; ðx n ; y n Þ with x i 2 Z Z p and y i 2 G. Let us write
The instance passes the test for a given test parameter ðs 1 ; . . . ; s n Þ 2 S n if and only if g s 1 1 þÁÁÁþs n n ¼ 1. If the instance contains an incorrect pair, there must be at least one i such that i 6 0 mod p. In that case, given any set of fs j g j6 ¼i , there can be at most one choice of s i satisfying s i i À P n j6 ¼i s j j mod p because any two elements s i , s Hence, for any given set of i , we have
From (1), we have ErrðV S Þ 1=jSj. t u
If the verifier rejects a given batch instance, there must be some bad exponents in the instance. In this case, we can identify the bad exponents by repeatedly splitting the instance into several subinstances. Furthermore, if the number of bad exponents is only one, we can identify it using at most dlog 2 ne þ 2 tests [16] .
In [2] , Bellare et al. introduced three tests. In the atomic test, S is taken to be f0; 1g. In the small exponent test, S is taken to be fs 2 Z Zj0 s < 2 ' g for a given screening parameter '. The bucket test is a combination of the atomic test and the small exponent test. In this paper, we consider different types of exponent sets consisting of sparse exponents.
How to Select Screening Parameters
The security level of today's signature schemes is usually set on 2 80 , which is equivalent to that of a 1,024-bit RSA or a 160-bit elliptic curve cryptosystem. But, logically, there is no reason to set the screening level of a batch verifier to the same level. This is because possession of the signing key does not put one at an advantage in creating a false signature that is more likely to pass any of the current batch verifiers. For example, in [2] and [4] , ' ¼ 60 was proposed for the most practical use.
Usually, the choice of the screening parameter depends on the situation in which each application is deployed. If an application performs only a small number of verifications, it would be very unlikely for it to accept any wrong instance in its lifetime, even with a small screening parameter. A batch verification algorithm is more efficient with a smaller screening parameter. Hence, it is desirable to set the screening parameter to as small as possible a value within the tolerable range for each application. We may consider using an iteration of several weak batch verifications to achieve a stronger batch verification. If we perform t independent batch verifications, each of screening level ', then the total screening level becomes t'. This enables us to parallelize a batch verification. Moreover, we can design a cascade filter for signatures consisting of successive weak batch verifiers. If the test fails in the first filter, the set of signatures should be moved to the step of identifying wrong signatures. If the test succeeds, it goes to the second filter and so on until the intended screening level is achieved. This would be useful for fast screening of DoS attacks.
SPARSE EXPONENT TEST
Basic Sparse Exponent Test
Let ' be the screening parameter and let the order of G be a prime p. In a sparse exponent test, we consider the set of exponents
where wtðsÞ is the Hamming weight of s in the binary representation. We can generate a random element of S by choosing k random values 0 r i < blog pc and taking s ¼ P i2fr1;r2;ÁÁÁ;rkg 2 i . This, in turn, can be done by generating about at most 2kdlogðblog pcÞe random bits and breaking off every dlogðblog pcÞe consecutive bits as r i . If the number r i is larger than blog pc, then we just discard the number. Since every element of S is distinct modulo p, we have ErrðV S Þ 1=jSj by Theorem 1. To bound ErrðV S Þ by 2 À' , k must be chosen to satisfy the following condition: Table 1 gives minimum k values for various screening parameters ' that satisfy the above equation when blog pc ¼ 160. Observe that k is much less than '=4. In particular, k '=5 for ' 50.
Our sparse exponent test is described in Fig. 2 . In order to perform the test efficiently, we use the usual technique of simultaneous multiplication. Table 2 gives the average number of operations required for verifying n instances using the naive test, the small exponent test (SE), and our sparse exponent test (SPET). The naive test verifies n instances independently. In the table, Exp, Mul, and Sqr represent exponentiation, multiplication, and squaring in G, respectively. P denotes a prime field ðSqr ¼ 0:8 MulÞ and B-PB and B-NB denote a binary field with a polynomial basis ðSqr ¼ 0:1 MulÞ and a binary field with a normal basis (Sqr is for free), respectively. Multiplication modulo p operations, needed for exponent calculation, as opposed to multiplications within the group in consideration, are ignored in total estimations.
Compared with the small exponent test, our method removes one exponentiation and reduces the number of multiplications at the cost of increasing only a small number of squarings (which is independent of n). Moreover, squaring is generally more efficient than multiplication [5] , [10] . 1 From Table 2 , we can see that our test is expected to be about 2 $ 3 times faster than the small exponent test as n grows.
The sparse exponent test can be applied to signature schemes based on modular exponentiations. It is especially useful on modified DSA, as given in [15] . Of course, due to the attack by Boyd and Pavlovski [4] , in using modified DSA, we need to take primes p and q such that ðp À 1Þ=ð2qÞ has no divisor less than q and regard two group elements as being equal if they are the same up to sign.
We can get another bucket test by combining our sparse exponent test with the atomic test, as was done in [2] . Our bucket test is more efficient than the original one. We compare the performance of the bucket test based on sparse exponents with the previous tests in Table 3 . In the table, we set p to be 160 bit primes and ' ¼ 60 as in [2] . Observe that our sparse exponent test improves the small exponent test by a factor of about two and our bucket test based on the sparse exponent test gives better performance than the original one.
A Group of Secret Order: A Composite Modulus
Let N be a product of two strong primes, p N and q N , such that p N ¼ 2p 
TABLE 2 Average Number of Operations for Verifying n-Instances
When blog p c ¼ 160 q 0 N . We assume that N is hard to factor. Then, we may take exponents even larger than N for batch verification. We consider
where L is the bit length of exponents. We may assume that the difference between any two elements in S is coprime to ðNÞ=4 ¼ p . Hence, by Theorem 1, we may assume that the error of batch verifier with exponent set S is bounded by 1=jSj.
The cardinality of S is given by
For a screening parameter ', k should be set to the minimum integer satisfying jSj > 2 ' . Table 4 gives several k values for various exponent sizes L and screening parameters '.
The sparse long exponent test is similar to the sparse exponent test (Fig. 2) . The only difference is that the order p of G is secret and that the bit length of exponents is longer. Since p is unknown, Step 3 of Fig. 2 is done using normal integer operations. It is useful for verifying a version of GQ signatures [9] , modified in the same way as was done in the modified DSA scheme [15] , [4] . A similar technique can be used to verify one of the two equalities from CramerShoup signatures based on strong RSA problems [6] . It can also be applied to RSA, but is efficient only when a relatively large public exponent is used.
Sparse Signed Binary Exponent Tests
In elliptic curves, subtractions are as efficient as additions. In this case, we may consider signed binary representation of exponents. Let S be the subset of nonnegative integers given by
where the number of nonzero a i is at most k. That is, an element of S has a nonadjacent representation of the weight k and the most significant bit is one. Then, any two elements in S are distinct modulo p since an integer less than p has a unique nonadjacent form (NAF) [17] . The cardinality of S is given in the next theorem.
Proof. We can regard an element of S as a string of length blog pc þ 1 with a blog pc ¼ 0. Thus, any element of S with exactly i-many nonzero a j can be obtained through the following process:
2. Choose i-many of the blanks and fill them with either 01 or 0 1, where 1 is meant to imply À1. The first position is an exception, which has to be filled with 01 to make the element positive. 3. Fill in other blanks with 0. Then, it is easily verified that the cardinality of S
In Table 5 , we compare the k values for sparse binary exponents and sparse signed binary exponents. Table 5 shows that the sparse signed binary version of batch verification could be more efficient when the screening parameter ' ! 40. ECDSA, which is the elliptic curve analogue of DSA, is a good example that admits a sparse signed binary exponent test [7] . As before, we have to slightly modify the ECDSA for batch verification, as was done with DSA [15] . It should be noted that, if we take an elliptic curve whose order is a prime, the Boyd and Pavlovski attack [4] , which causes problems in such modifications, can be avoided.
COMPLEX EXPONENT TEST
Note that the error probability of the batch verification test depends on the size of exponent set. Thus, if we can extend the exponent set to some noninteger exponents which efficiently act on the underlying group, we may be able to speed up the test. One example is the Frobenius map acting on elliptic curves. In this section, we introduce the use of complex exponents and show that it is twice as fast as the previous sparse exponent test. 
where O is the point at infinity. Now, we consider two candidates for the exponent set,
where the number of nonzero a i is at most k. We note that each S i is a set of generalized signed -adic NAF expansions. To count the number of elements in S i which are distinct as endomorphisms on G, we need the following lemma: Lemma 1. Let e ! 6 and let fðxÞ ¼ P eÀ1 i¼0 a i x i be a polynomial
Proof. By the division algorithm, we have g i ; r i 2 Z Z such that
Then, by equating the coefficients of x eÀi , we have
We also have . Thus, we have, for i ! 4,
by the Hasse-Weil Theorem, where E 1 is E if t > 0 or the twist of E (with q þ 1 þ t IF q -rational points) if t < 0. Hence, we have
Using this bound, we have
Suppose fðÞP ¼ O. Let j be the smallest index such that a j 6 ¼ b j . Then, gðxÞ ¼ ðf
by the definition of S 1 and S 2 . If both of a j and b j are nonzero, then a jþ1 ¼ b jþ1 ¼ 0 and q 2 6 j qc 1 þ tc 0 ¼ tc 0 . In both cases, gðxÞ cannot be divided by x 2 À tx þ q, which is a contradiction.
t u
The cardinality of S i is given in the next theorem.
Theorem 4. The cardinality of S i is given by
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 2. That is, 1) consider e þ 1 À i blanks for elements S 1 (respectively, S 2 ), 2) choose i positions from the blanks and fill them in with nonzero a i , and 3) fill in other positions with 0. In this case, a negative coefficient is allowed in the most significant nonzero position.
The difference is that the number of elements for nonzero coefficients is 2q À 2 for S 1 (respectively, q 2 À q for S 2 ). This completes the proof. t u
Our complex exponent test using Frobenius maps is described in Fig. 3 . In order to perform the test efficiently, we utilize BGMW multiplications [1] .
In Table 6 , for some powers of prime q, we presented the maximum e such that all elements of S i are distinct as endomorphisms on G. We also compute the maximum weight k making the cardinality of S i greater than 2 ' , for various screening parameters '. For example, when q ¼ 8, the maximum e becomes 48 and we need only nine elliptic curve additions for each exponentiation when the number of batch instances n is large. More precisely, to verify n exponentiations, we need 9n þ 84 elliptic curve additions when a normal basis is used to represent field elements.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed two batch verification algorithms using sparse exponents of small weights. The first one makes use of exponents of (signed) binary representation. We can take exponents whose weight is less than '=4 when using binary expansion and less than '=5:5 with signed binary expansion, while the average weight of exponents was '=2 for the original small exponent test. Hence, we can expect our test to be about two times faster. If we are using a group whose order is secret, as in the RSA situation, we can extend our algorithm to allow for longer exponents to reduce the weight of exponents.
The second of our batch verification algorithms can only be applied to a special family of elliptic curves defined over small finite fields. It utilizes exponents of sparse -adic expansion. By enlarging the coefficient set of the expansion, we obtained a complex exponent test much faster than sparse exponent test. . For more information on this or any other computing topic, please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
